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Hall v. Nalco Co.: Redefining Female Infertility
Bioloqically, men and women both suffer from infertility
problems. Emotionally, both members of a couple experience the
agony of an inability to conceive, whether the cause of the
infertility may be attributed to the male or female partner. Legally,
however, some federal courts have chosen to treat a woman's
infertility differently than a man's infertility.
According to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
(PDA), sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of
"pregnancy, childbirth and related medical conditions." 2 During
the past two decades, several courts have considered whether the
"related medical conditions" language of the PDA protects a
female employee who receives treatments for infertility. Some
courts have answered in the negative, 3 while at least two district
courts have answered in the affirmative.4 These cases have inspired
numerous scholarly articles arguing the pros and cons of
recognizing infertility protection in the PDA. On July 16, 2008,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit weighed
in on the debate. In Hall v. Nalco Co.,6 the Seventh Circuit held
that because only women receive procedures such as in vitro
Copyright 2009, by ERIN PERCY.
1. See NEGAR NICOLE JACOBS, COPING WITH INFERTILITY: CLINICALLY
PROVEN WAYS OF MANAGING THE EMOTIONAL ROLLER COASTER 19 (2007)
("Since women carry and deliver a baby, there is a common misconception that
infertility is the woman's problem. However, the causes of infertility can be
attributed to women, men, or both. In actuality, men and women are equally
affected by biological causes of infertility.").
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
3. See, e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003);
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
4. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Coils. & Univs. for Ne. Ill. Univ.,
911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. I11. 1995); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp.
1393 (N.D. I11. 1994). Other district courts have dealt with the issue of whether
the PDA protects a female employee who receives fertility treatments, but these
two cases are cited with approval by Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir.
2008), discussed infra.
5. See, e.g., Cintra D. Bentley, A Pregnant Pause: Are Women Who
Undergo Fertility Treatment to Achieve Pregnancy Within the Scope of Title
VII's Pregnancy Discrimination Act?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 391 (1998); E.
Renee Backmeyer, Lack of Insurance Coverage for Prescription Contraception
By An Otherwise Comprehensive Plan As a Violation of Title VII as Amended by
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act-Stretching the Statute Too Far, 37 IND. L.
REV. 437, 456 (2004); Kathleen E. Abel, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act and
Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment: An Inconceivable Union, 37
CONN. L. REV. 819 (2005); Maureen E. Eldredge, The Quest for a Lactating
Male: Biology, Gender and Discrimination, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875 (2005).
6. 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008).
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fertilization (IVF), and IVF relates to a woman's capacity to bear
children, discrimination based on a female employee's infertility
treatment constitutes sex discrimination under the PDA.
The Seventh Circuit erred in its holding. This Note argues that
Hall employed language from an inapposite United States Supreme
Court case to stretch the PDA and dodge the real question of the
case: whether a woman's fertility is protected by the PDA. Part I of
this Note outlines the history of sex discrimination and the PDA.
Part II offers a short background on infertility and discusses the
policy reasons for and against protecting a woman's infertility under
the PDA. Part III presents the facts of Hall, its procedural history,
and the Seventh Circuit's decision. Part IV analyzes the Supreme
Court case of International Union v. Johnson Controls, on which the
Seventh Circuit relied in Hall. Part IV also summarizes other courts'
analyses of the PDA's scope and analogizes the infertility issue to
the similar debate concerning whether the PDA protects a woman's
right to oral contraceptives. Part V elaborates on the error in the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Hall. Finally, Part VI discusses the
proper avenues of redress available to a plaintiff who experiences
adverse employment action based on her infertility. This Note
concludes that the PDA is inapplicable to a plaintiff who is fired for
missing work to receive IVF.
1. DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX OR PREGNANCY
Within Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the PDA protects
female employees from adverse employment actions based on
pregnancy. Title VII prohibits discrimination "because of' sex,
and the PDA adds pregnancy and childbirth to the definition of
sex.8 Thus, firing someone because she is pregnant is a form of
gender discrimination in violation of Title VII.
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
The purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to "vindicate
human dignity,"10 and Title VII pursues that interest by prohibiting
discrimination in the employment realm."1 Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits adverse employment actions based on
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
8. HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH S. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 130 (2d ed. 2004).
9. Id.
10. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 292 (1964)
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
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an employee's race, color, religion, national origin, or, most
importantly for the purposes of this Note, sex.
12
There are two main theories under which an employee may
assert a Title VII sex discrimination claim: disparate treatment or
disparate impact. 13 Disparate treatment claims allege different
treatment "because of' or "based on" gender. 14 A plaintiff claiming
disparate treatment must show that her employer "intentionally
disfavored women."' 15 Courts have recognized that it is not always
self-evident that an employer's adverse employment action is
"because of' a plaintiffs membership in the protected class.
16
Consequently, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme
Court established a burden-shifting analysis for disparate treatment
claims lacking direct evidence of discrimination. 17 Though
McDonnell Douglas dealt with a claim of racial discrimination,
courts have modified the framework to fit cases dealing with other
protected classes. 18 For example, in a sex discrimination case, a
court may require a plaintiff to show: "(1) that she belongs to the
protected class (e.g., female or pregnant); (2) that she performed
her duties satisfactorily; (3) that she suffered an adverse
employment action; [and (4)] that similarly situated employees not
in the protected class.. . received better treatment."
19
Disparate impact claims, on the other hand, involve facially
neutral employment actions that disproportionately affect a
plaintiff based on her sex.20 While disparate treatment cases
12. Id.
13. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977).
14. Eldredge, supra note 5, at 877.
15. Id.
16. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 8, at 133 n.20.
17. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The
McDonnell Douglas requirements for a prima facie case of racial discrimination are:
(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that [the plaintiff]
applied and was qualified for the job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite [the plaintiffs] qualifications, [the
plaintiff] was rejected; and (iv) after such rejection the job remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants...
Id.
18. Eldredge, supra note 5, at 877. See, e.g., Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc.,
138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying the McDonnell Douglas test to
pregnancy discrimination claim); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626
(1987) (applying the McDonnell Douglas test to disparate treatment gender
discrimination claim absent a facially discriminatory policy); Meiri v. Dacon,
759 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying the McDonnell Douglas test to claim of
religious discrimination).
19. Eldredge, supra note 5, at 877.
20. MACK A. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
111 (2004).
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generally turn on intent, disparate impact cases rely on statistics.21
The burden of proof for a disparate impact claim is initially placed
on the plaintiff to show, through statistical evidence, that the
employer's policy has a disproportionate impact on the protected
class of female employees.2 2 The burden then shifts to the
defendant-employer to assert a business necessity defense. In other
words, the employer must show that the policy is based on job
performance and not on sex.23
B. Pregnancy Discrimination
Since 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) 24 has maintained "that employment policies .. . that
[discriminate against] female employees because of pregnancy,
childbirth, and related medical conditions constitute disparate
treatment based on sex." 25 However, the Supreme Court did not
initially follow the EEOC's guidance. In 1976, the Court held in
General Electric Co. v. Gilber?6 that an employer's failure to
provide insurance coverage for disabilities arising from pregnancy
did not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII. 2 7 According
to the Court, the failure to provide disability benefits for pregnancy
did not discriminate between women and men, but rather between
pregnant employees and non-pregnant employees, male and
female.28 The Supreme Court held that the employer in Gilbert had
21. Deborah L. Rhode & Joan C. Williams, Legal Perspectives on
Employment Discrimination, in SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 235,
236 (Faye J. Crosby et al. eds., 2007).
22. Wesley Kobylak, Annotation, Disparate impact test for sex
discrimination in employment under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
US.C.A. § 2000e etseq.), 68 A.L.R. FED. 19 (2008).
23. Id.
24. PLAYER, supra note 20, at 25-26 ("The EEOC is a five-person,
presidentially appointed independent commission. Regional offices of the EEOC
are located in major cities throughout the country. Charges of discrimination are
filed by aggrieved individuals in a regional office of the agency and investigated
by the personnel in that office. If the EEOC cannot informally resolve the
conflict, it will notify the charging party, who may then file a private judicial
action.").
25. BARBARA L1NDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 438 (3d ed. 1996). See also EEOC, Pregnancy
Discrimination, http://www.eeoc.gov/types/pregnancy.html (last visited Nov. 4,
2008) ("In Fiscal Year 2007, EEOC received 5,587 charges of pregnancy-based
discrimination.").
26. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
27. LINDEMANN, supra note 25, at 439; Bentley, supra note 5, at 401-02.
28. Eldredge, supra note 5, at 875.
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not discriminated on the basis of sex under Title VII, 29 reasoning
that "[w]hile it is true that only women can become pregnant, it
does not follow that every legislative classification concerning
pregnancy is a sex-based classification. 30
In response to Gilbert, Congress enacted the PDA in 1978,
redefining "sex discrimination" to include discrimination based on
pregnancy. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), the Act states:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex"
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and
nothing in section 703(h) of this title shall be interpreted to
permit otherwise. 31
The PDA's "dominant principle is nondiscrimination, rather
than preference." 32 In other words, the PDA obligates employers to
treat pregnant women the same as, but not better than, other, non-
pregnant employees. 33 Consequently, the PDA does not require an
employer to provide leave or benefits for pregnancy that the
employer does not provide to non-pregnant employees for
"comarable conditions.3 ' For example, in Armindo v. Padlocker,
Inc., 3the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
held that the PDA is not violated by an employer who fires an
employee for excessive absences, even if those absences were a
result of pregnancy, unless the employer overlooks the absences of
other, non-pregnant employees. 36 Similarly, in Troupe v. May
Department Stores Co., the Seventh Circuit rejected a pregnancy
discrimination claim from a plaintiff alleging that her employer
fired her for tardiness caused by morning sickness.37 The plaintiff
in Troupe failed to make out a sex discrimination case because she
29. LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 25, at 439.
30. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134 (quoting Geduldig v. Ailleo, 417 U.S. 484,
496-97 n.20 (1974)).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
32. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 8, at 130.
33. Id.
34. Id. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 286-87
(1987).
35. 209F.3d 1319 (llth Cir. 2000).
36. Id. at 1320.
37. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
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could not prove the employer treated her differently than other
excessively absent, non-pregnant employees. 38 The Seventh Circuit
stated:
The [PDA] does not, despite the urgings of feminist scholars
[,] require employers to offer maternity leave or take other
steps to make it easier for pregnant women to work ....
Employers can treat pregnant women as badly as they treat
similarly affected but non-pregnant employees, even to the
point of "conditioning the availability of an employment
benefit on an employee's decision to return to work after the
end of the medical disability that pregnancy causes."
39
The PDA does, however, allow states to create legislation that
requires employers to give special treatment to pregnant
employees. In California Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Guerra, the Supreme Court upheld a state statute ordering
employers to provide pregnant employees with up to four months
of unpaid leave.40 The Court explained that Congress intended the
PDA to be a "floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits
may not drop, not a ceiling above which they may not rise. 'Al The
language of the PDA does not preclude employment practices that
favor pregnant women; rather, the Act prohibits employers from
treating pregnant employees unfavorably as compared to the rest of
the workforce.42
II. INFERTILITY, AN INCREASINGLY COMMON PROBLEM
Infertility, defined as the "inability of a couple to achieve a
pregnancy after repeated intercourse without contraception for one
year," affects one of every five couples in the United States.4 3 Age
is an important factor in a couple's ability to produce children, and
because people are choosing to marry and start families later in
life, infertility is becoming more and more prevalent.44 The cause
of a couple's infertility may be due to problems in the man, the
woman, or both. 45 Approximately thirty-five percent of cases are
38. Id, discussed in LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 25, at 442.
39. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738 (citations omitted).
40. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
41. Id. at 285.
42. Id. at 292 n.32.
43. Infertility, in THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION (Mark
H. Beers et al. eds., 2004-2008), available at www.merck.com/mmhe/sec22/
ch254/ch254a.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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termed "female factor," and thirty-five percent of cases are termed
"male factor.' 46 In twenty percent of the cases, the cause of
infertility is a combination of problems in the male and the female
both, and in the remaining ten percent of cases the cause of
infertility is unknown.
47
A. Available Treatments
The type of treatment a couple receives for an infertility
problem may depend entirely upon the causes underlying the
couple's inability to conceive. For women, many treatment options
are available. Nonsurgical remedies include fertility drugs and
artificial insemination." Surgery may be necessary for women
who wish to reverse a tubal ligation procedure or whose infertility
is due to scarring caused by sexually transmitted diseases or related
to endometriosis.49
IVF, the impregnation procedure undergone by the plaintiff in
Hall, is one of the three most commonly known Assisted
Reproductive Technologies (ARTS).5° lVF involves removing an
egg from a woman's ovary and fertilizing it outside of the body.5 1
The procedure takes place in five main steps:
[First,] fertility drugs are given to the female during the first
week of the IVF cycle. These drugs are intended to stimulate
the growth of ovarian follicles containing eggs. [Second,] the
eggs are retrieved from the woman's body using an
ultrasound-guided needle. [Third,] once the eggs have been
removed from the woman's body, they are placed in a petri
dish along with a sample of sperm. The dish is allowed to
incubate so fertilization can take place. [Fourth,] a number of
the most developed embryos are transferred to the uterus.
[Fifth,] the embryos implant themselves into the uterine
lining. [After] successful implantation the embryos develop
as they would in a normal pregnancy.
46. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 19.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 30.
49. Id. at 31.
50. Id. Other commonly known ARTS include Gamete Intrafallopian
Transfer (GIFT) and Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer (ZIFT). Id. These
procedures differ with respect to where the sperm are introduced to the egg. Id.
In a GIFT procedure, for example, fertilization occurs in a woman's fallopian
tubes rather than in a petri dish. Id.
51. Id. at 32.
52. Id. at 32-33.
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Though IVF is often a viable option for infertile women, there is a
downside: IVF is costly. The approximate price per procedure is
$10,000. 53 Unfortunately, the success rates are low and the
likelihood of conception decreases with each treatmenti':
Treatments for male factor infertility are often as physically
invasive as treatments for women. 5 5 While feminist scholars have
attempted to downplay men's role in infertility treatment, 56 male
partners often must subject themselves to a series of tests and
procedures to diagnose and treat the cause of the infertility.57 For
instance, a diagnosis of male infertility may include a physical
exam, semen analysis, transrectal ultrasound, and testicular
biopsy.5 8 If the infertility is related to an infection affecting the
production or movement of sperm, a man may undergo antibiotic
treatment. 59 Many surgical procedures may also be used to correct
male factor infertility. 60 Men who have had vasectomies may
undergo vasectomy reversals, for example. 61 Surgery also is an
option for men whose infertility is caused by blockages in the
reproductive tract such as those with varicoceles or blocked
ejaculatory ducts.6; In addition, men with low sperm counts may
receive treatment through microsurgical techniques involving
aspiration or extraction of sperm.
63
B. Is it Really Different for Women?
Courts have argued that, because both men and women suffer
from infertility, the condition is gender neutral and thus not
deserving of protection as sex discrimination under the PDA.64
53. Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility: Recognizing Coverage
Exclusion as Discrimination, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 293, 337 (2005).
54. Id. See also LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 762
(W.D. Mich. 2001). Each IVF procedure requires frequent trips to the doctor to
avoid hyperstimulation, a condition which causes the ovaries to swell. Id.
Hyperstimulation can be life-threatening because of possible interference with
kidney and liver functions. Id.
55. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 30.
56. See, e.g., Bentley, supra note 5, at 398.
57. Brief of Defendant-Appellee Nalco Co. at 16, Hall v. Nalco Co., 534
F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3684), (citing UrologyHealth.org, http://www.
urologyhealth.org/adult/index.cfm?cat=- 1 &topic=38).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 31.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 17.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003).
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Other courts and some scholars counter that, in reality, the
condition affects men and women differently.
65
Fertility doctors admit that, for many years, there existed a
"peculiar reluctance" to acknowledge the importance of a thorough
investigation of the male partner in infertility cases, which may
have led to a societal understanding of infertility as the female
partner's problem.66 This reluctance may have proceeded from
cultural ideas concerning gender.67 Even today, society attaches a
greater stigma to infertile men, owing to cultural attitudes
concerning masculinity and male sexuality.68 Often a couple's
infertility is ascribed to a woman in order to protect her husband
from this stigma.69 Some studies show that higher guilt and blame
levels exist among infertile men than among men with infertile
partners. 70 The fact that women alone often must undergo
treatment such as IVF may be attributed part1y to these social and
cultural ideas surrounding a man's infertility.
Despite societal opinions, the medical profession views
infertility as a couple's disease rather than a woman's problem.
72
Anne Jequier, a professor of obstetrics and gynecology, wrote in
2000:
65. See, e.g., Bentley, supra note 5, at 416-17 ("A diagnosis of infertility
occurs when a woman is unable to conceive; therefore, when a woman
undergoes fertility treatment she is seeking assistance with conception. When
we refer to a woman's infertility as a gender-neutral condition, we have stripped
her condition of any reference to its implications for potential pregnancy."). See
also Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Erickson
v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs. for Ne. I11. Univ., 911 F. Supp. 316
(N.D. Ill. 1995).
66. T.D. GLOVER ET AL., HuMAN MALE FERTILITY AND SEMEN ANALYSIS
vii (1990).
67. Id.
68. Gay Becker, Deciding Whether to Tell Children about Donor
Insemination: An Unresolved Question in the United States, in INFERTILITY
AROUND THE GLOBE: NEW THINKING ON CHILDLESSNESS, GENDER, AND
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 119, 119-20 (Marcia C. Inhorn & Frank van
Balen eds., 2002).
69. Id. at 120.
70. Id.
71. Frank van Balen & Marcia C. Inhorn, Interpreting Infertility: A View
from the Social Sciences, in INFERTILITY AROUND THE GLOBE: NEW THINKING
ON CHILDLESSNESS, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 3, 14-15
(Marcia C. Inhom & Frank van Balen eds., 2002) ("Thus feminist critics in
particular have pointed to this basic inequality-of women being treated for
male infertility by means of [] risky, expensive, and not highly successful
therap[ies]-as a potent example of male bias in the practices of modern
Western biomedicine.").
72. See, e.g., Nikolai Manassiev, Naim Abusheikha & John Collins,
Infertility, in FEMALE REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH (Nikolai Manassiev ed., 2004).
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Need one say again that infertility is a disorder of a couple,
not of an individual, and the treatment of a couple's
infertility is the evaluation of this childlessness in relation
to both these individuals .... For this reason, both partners
must be involved in the investigation of infertility as factors
that may contribute to their problem of childlessness can
interact in many often very subtle ways. Thus, both
partners must be equally involved in all facets of the
problem. 73
Biology aside, the fact is that women today shoulder much of
the responsibility in the effort to conceive through fertility
treatments, regardless of the underlying causes.74 For instance,
even when the male partner of a couple is the source of the
infertility problem, the female must subject herself to invasive
impregnation procedures. 75 In addition to the time spent in clinics
and hospitals undergoing these procedures, women also assume
much higher levels of medical risk.76 Yet, the treatment a woman
chooses to receive for her infertility does not change the incidence
of infertility in men, and, more importantly, it does not change the
wording of the PDA or Title VII. If the PDA protects a woman's
infertility, this protection must arise from the text of the Act.
Rather than analyze the Act's language, however, the Seventh
Circuit in Hall relied on inapposite case law to expand the PDA
beyond its scope.
III. HALL V. NALCO: THE CASE AT ISSUE
In Hall, plaintiff Cheryl Hall asked the Seventh Circuit to
recognize a claim against her employer, Nalco, based on her
membership in the PDA-protected class of infertile women.
77
73. ANNE M. JEQUIER, MALE INFERTILITY: A GUIDE FOR THE CLINICIAN 6
(2000).
74. Id. at 36.
75. Id. See also MARGARET MARSH & WANDA RONNER, THE EMPTY
CRADLE: INFERTILITY IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 4
(1996) ("Although men are infertile as often as women, throughout these three
centuries the woman, whether or not she has been the infertile partner, has
disproportionately borne the medical, social, and cultural burden of a couple's
failure to conceive. From the eighteenth century, when impotence was
considered to be the only cause of sterility in men, to the late twentieth century,
when women undergo invasive procedures in order to maximize the fertilizing
potential of a partner's barely mobile sperm, women have been subject to more
treatment, endured more blame, and generally felt more answerable for a
couple's inability to conceive than their husbands.").
76. Balen & Inhom, supra note 73, at 14.
77. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 645 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Refusing to acknowledge such a class, the Seventh Circuit held
instead that Nalco had violated the PDA by discriminating against
Hall based on her "potential for pregnancy. '78 Following the
reasoning of two district court cases from the mid-1990s, the
Seventh Circuit erroneously relied on Johnson Controls, an
irrelevant Supreme Court case.7 9 By dodging the issue presented
by Hall in her appeal-whether infertile women constitute a
protected class under the PDA-the Seventh Circuit ignored the
ongoing debate in courts across the United States. 80 Hall
essentially redefined a woman's infertility, in the context of IVF
treatment, as the sex-specific state of "childbearing capacity.",8'
A. The Facts
Nalco, a water treatment business, 82 hired Cheryl Hall in 1997
to work as a maintenance secretary in one of its manufacturing
facilities in the Chicago area.83 In 2000, Hall took a position as a
sales secretary. In this capacity she reported to Marv Baldwin, a
district sales manager in the area. 84 Early in 2003, Hall told
Baldwin that she wished to undergo IVF treatments due to her
infertility.85 Hall filed a formal request for leave in March of that
year.86 Hall's leave of absence lasted from March 24, 2003, to
87April 21, 2003. In late April, after learning that the first IVF
treatment had been unsuccessful, Hall told Baldwin that she
planned to undergo the treatment again.
88
Meanwhile, in January of 2003, Nalco began reorganizing its
facilities, ultimately deciding to consolidate Hall's office with
another sales office.8 9 Each of the two offices employed a sales
secretary.90 As a result of the consolidation, Nalco decided to keep
78. Id. at 648-49.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 649.
82. Brief of Defendant-Appellee Nalco Co., supra note 59, at 3.
83. Id.; Hall, 534 F.3d at 645.
84. Hall, 534 F. 3d at 645.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 646. According to Hall, "[she] was required to be on bed rest for
48 hours, followed by four weeks of absence from work." Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellant Cheryl Hall at 6, Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (No.
06-3684).
88. Hall, 534 F.3d at 646.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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only one of these two secretaries. 91 Near the end of July 2003,
Baldwin informed Hall that Nalco had decided to terminate Hall
and retain the sales secretary from the other office.92 Prior to Hall's
termination, Baldwin discussed the issue with Jaqueline Bonin,
Nalco's employee-relations manager. 93 Bonin's notes from that
conversation reflect that Hall had "missed a lot of work due to
health" and cite "absenteeism-infertility treatments" in a section
relating to Hall's job performance. 94 Shana Dwyer, the secretary
who was retained, was at the time of the consolidation incapable of
becoming pregnant and had been since 1988.95
After her termination, Hall filed an action against Nalco alleging
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
961964. Specifically, she alleged that her termination violated the
PDA, which amended Title VII to state that discrimination "because
of sex" includes "related medical conditions" of pregnancy.97 Hall
argued that she was fired for being "a member of a protected class,
female with a pregnancy related condition, infertility., 98
B. District Court Decision
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division, granted summary judgment for Nalco.99
According to the district court, the central issue of the case
concerned "whether a reasonable jury could find that infertility is
included in the meaning of the phrase 'related medical conditions'
of the PDA."'00 Judge David H. Coar held that infertile women are
not a protected class under the PDA because infertility is a gender-
neutral condition. 1 1 Judge Coar relied heavily on Saks v. Franklin
Covey Co.102 and Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center,103
cases dealing with Title VII insurance coverage claims.
Citing Krauel, Judge Coar observed in Hall: "Neither the
legislative history nor the EEOC guidelines reference infertility
treatments or suggest that infertility should fall within the scope of
91. Id.
92. Hall v. Nalco Co., No. 04 C 7294, slip op. at 1 (N.D. I11. Sept. 12, 2006).
93. Hall, 534 F.3d at 646.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
98. Hall, 534 F.3d at 646.
99. Hall v. Nalco Co., No. 04 C 7294, slip op. at 3 (N.D. 111. Sept. 12, 2006).
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id.
102. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003).
103. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
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the PDA."' 0 4 According to Judge Coar, the PDA protects female
employees from pregnancy discrimination because pregnancy is a
condition that affects only women.10 5 Because men and women
suffer from infertility with equal frequency, however, Judge Coar
concluded that seeking infertility treatments does not give rise to
grounds for sex discrimination under the PDA. 10 6 Judge Coar
agreed with Saks and Krauel that "infertility standing alone does
not fall within the meaning of the phrase 'related medical
conditions' under the PDA."'l r
C. Seventh Circuit Reverses
Hall appealed, and on July 16, 2008, the Seventh Circuit
10 8
reversed Judge Coar's decision. The Seventh Circuit held that Hall
had presented a cognizable sex discrimination claim, stating:
Although infertility affects both men and women, Hall
claims she was terminated for undergoing a medical
procedure-a particular form of surgical impregnation-
performed only on women on account of their childbearing
capacity. Because adverse employment actions taken on
account of childbearing capacity affect only women, Hall
has stated a cognizable sex-discrimination claim under the
language of the PDA. 109
In this way, the Seventh Circuit ignored what the district court
considered to be the ultimate question of the case: whether the
"related medical conditions" language of the PDA reaches fertility.
Instead, the court relied on the Supreme Court case of Johnson
Controls" in its holding.' In Johnson Controls, the Supreme
Court dealt with an employer policy that prohibited female
employees who were capable of bearing children from Working in
certain areas. 112 The Seventh Circuit noted that Johnson Controls
recognized the applicability of the PDA to classifications based on
104. Hall, No. 04 C 7294, slip op at 2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2006) (citing
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679-80).
105. Id. at 2.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Saks, 316 F.3d at 346 (2d Cir. 2003); Krauel, 95 F.3d at
679-80).
108. The panel included Judges Diane Sykes, Kenneth Ripple, and Ilana
Rovner. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008).
109. Hall, 534 F.3d at 645.
110. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
111. Hall, 534 F.3d at 647.
112. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 192.
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"potential for pregnancy" and not merely the actual state of
pregnancy. 13 According to the Seventh Circuit, it was not Hall's
fertility that was at issue, but the treatment she received as a
result-the surgical impregnation procedure that could have
rendered Hall pregnant."
The Seventh Circuit pointed out that both Saks and Krauel
distinguished Johnson Controls because, while Johnson Controls
dealt with a policy that discriminated on the basis of childbearing
capacity, the policies in Saks and Krauel discriminated based on
"fertility alone." ' 15 The Supreme Court implicitly held in Johnson
Controls that discrimination based on "fertility alone" is not
prohibited by the PDA, which reaches only gender-specific
classifications. 1" 6 But, the Seventh Circuit concluded, Nalco had
discriminated against Hall based not on infertility alone but on her
capacity to bear children:
Nalco's conduct, viewed in the light most favorable to Hall,
suffers from the same defect as the policy in Johnson
Controls. Employees terminated for taking time off to
undergo IVF-just like those terminated for taking time off
to give birth or receive other pregnancy-related care-will
always be women. This is necessarily so; 1VF is one of
several reproductive technologies that involve a surgical
impregnation procedure. 117
The Seventh Circuit admitted that it decided the case using a
legal theory different from the one set forth in Hall's complaint. 18
Because Hall received sex-specific medical treatment, the court
redefined her infertility as "potential for pregnancy," a characteristic
protected by the PDA according to the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of Johnson Controls.'r9 The court cited Pacourek v.
Inland Steel Co. 120 and Erickson v. Board of Governors of State
Colleges & Universities for Northeastern Illinois University12 1 in
113. Hall, 534 F.3d at 648 n.1.
114. Id. at 648-49.
115. Id. at 647.
116. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198.
117. Hall, 534 F.3d at 648-49.
118. Id. at 649 n.3 ("We recognize that our analysis differs from the legal
theory set forth in Hall's complaint-that infertile women are a protected class
under the language of the PDA. However, '[a] complaint need not identify a
legal theory, and specifying an incorrect theory is not fatal' to a plaintiff's
claim.") (citations omitted).
119. Id.at648.
120. 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
121. 911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
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support of its holding that Hall's allegations presented a viable claim
of sex discrimination.12
Nalco's request for a rehearing and rehearing en banc was
denied on August 15, 2008.123
IV. OTHER COURTS AND THE INFERTILITY DEBATE
The other courts that have dealt with the issue of infertility in a
PDA-related context have analyzed whether the language of the
Act reaches a woman's inability to conceive. Understanding how
the Seventh Circuit diverged from this line of reasoning and why
this divergence was in error requires knowledge of the background
concerning these other courts' holdings.
A. Johnson Controls and "Potential for Pregnancy"
In Hall, the Seventh Circuit relied on language from the 1991
Supreme Court case Johnson Controls to hold that Hall had stated
a viable pregnancy discrimination claim. 124 Johnson Controls
concerned employer-defendant Johnson Controls, a company that
manufactures batteries. 125 Lead is a primary ingredient in the
battery manufacturing process, and occupational exposure to lead
causes several health risks, including the possibility of harm to a
fetus carried by a female employee. 126 After several employees
became pregnant while maintaining dangerously high blood lead
levels, Johnson Controls decided to ban fertile women from jobs
that involved lead exposure. 127 Despite evidence that lead exposure
also affects male fertility, the employer prohibited only female
employees from these workstations. 
28
Johnson Controls promulgated a broad exclusion policy that
stated: "[W]omen who are pregnant or who are capable of bearing
children will not be placed into jobs involving lead exposure or
which could expose them to lead through the exercise of job
bidding, bumping, transfer or promotion rights.'
129
The policy constituted what is known as "sex plus," disparate
treatment discrimination. "Sex plus" discrimination refers to a
policy or practice by which an employer classifies employees on
122. Hall, 534 F.3d at 649.
123. Id. at 644.
124. Id. at 647-48.
125. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 190 (1991).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 192.
128. Id. at 198.
129. Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
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the basis of sex plus another characteristic.' 30 In such cases the
employer does not discriminate against all women, for example,
but only against a particular subclass of women. 3 1 Johnson
Controls' policy was first and foremost facially discriminatory
against female employees,1 32 but it subdivided this group into two
categories-fertile and infertile-and discriminated against only
the fertile subclass.
A group of Johnson Controls' employees filed a class action
lawsuit against the company; some petitioners were females who
had suffered pay losses when they were transferred out of jobs
involving lead exposure, and at least one petitioner was a male
employee who had been denied a request for leave of absence for
the purpose of lowering his lead level because he intended to
become a father. 133 The Supreme Court held that Johnson
Controls' sex-specific policy violated Title VII by facially
discriminating against female employees. 134 The Court did not rely
on the PDA in its holding but merely referenced the Act,
commenting that Johnson Controls' use of the words "capable of
bearing children" classified on the basis of potential for
pregnancy. 135 Such a classification, said the Court, constitutes sex
discrimination under the PDA. 136
B. Krauel and Saks: Two Circuits Consider Infertility and the PDA
Two cases from the United States Courts of Appeals, both
dealing with Title VII insurance coverage claims, directly
addressed the issue presented in Hall of whether infertile women
constitute a protected class under the PDA. Both Kraue 138 and
Saks'39 held that, according to its wording, the PDA does not
encompass infertility treatments, which are not pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions under the Act's statutory
language. 140 The Northern District of Illinois followed the
reasoning of these cases to grant summary judgment for Nalco.141
130. LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 25, at 456.
131. Id.
132. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197.
133. Id. at 192.
134. Id. at 197.
135. Id. at 198-99.
136. Id. at 199.
137. Id.
138. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
139. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003).
140. Hall v. Nalco Co., No. 04 C 7294, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2006).
141. Id. at 7.
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Krauel, an Eighth Circuit case, involved Mary Jo Krauel, a
female employee who gave birth to a child conceived through
Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT). 142 Krauel's employer's
medical plan did not provide coverage for the procedure.14 She
challenged the plan as violative of several anti-discrimination
statues, including Title VII as amended by the PDA. The Eighth
Circuit said that the "related medical conditions" language of 42
U.S.C. section 2000e(k) referred to "pregnancy" and "childbirth;"
because infertility relates to a pre-conception issue, the court held
that infertility is not a "related medical condition[]" of
pregnancy. 144 Focusing on the "general rules of statutory
construction," the Eighth Circuit interpreted "related" as a
reference to the specific enumerations of "pregnancy" and
"childbirth.' 45  Noting that pregnancy and childbirth are
"strikingly different" from infertility, which prevents conception
altogether, the Krauel court held that infertility is not a "related
medical condition[]" for the purposes of the PDA. 146
The Eighth Circuit distinguished Johnson Controls, in which
the employer policy applied only to females capable of becoming
pregnant. 1 7 "Potential pregnancy, unlike infertility[,]" said the
Eighth Circuit, "is a medical condition that is sex-related because
only women can become pregnant."'148 Concluding that a policy
denying insurance benefits for infertility treatments applies to both
male and female workers, the Eighth Circuit found Johnson
Controls inapposite.
149
The Second Circuit dealt with infertility in the context of the
PDA with Saks, wherein the plaintiff, Rochelle Saks, received
infertility treatments during her period of employment with
Franklin Covey from 1995 to 1999.150 Franklin Covey's health
benefits plan excluded coverage for "[s]urgical impregnation
procedures, including artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization
or embryo and fetal implants," even if medically necessary. 151 Saks
sued Franklin Covey under the PDA for reimbursement of the
costs associated with her infertility treatments.152 The Second
142. GIFT is an ART similar to IVF. See supra note 52.
143. Krauel, 95 F.3d at 676.
144. Id. at 679.
145. Id. at 679-80.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 680.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 342 (2d Cir. 2003).
151. Id. at 341.
152. Id. at 342.
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Circuit interpreted the PDA to require employers to recognize
pregnanc and related conditions as sex-based characteristics of
women.' Under this reasoning, for a condition to fall within the
PDA's scope, that condition must be unique to females.
154
The Second Circuit focused on the absurdity of equating
discrimination based on infertility with sex discrimination:
"Including infertility within the PDA's protection as a 'related
medical condition' would result in the anomaly of defining a class
that simultaneously includes equal numbers of both sexes and yet
is somehow vulnerable to sex discrimination."
155
Because both men and women suffer from infertility, the
Second Circuit held that the exclusion of surgical impregnation
procedures from employees' health care plans disadvantages male
and female employees equally.156 Thus, the court reasoned that
Saks' claim did not fall within the scope of the PDA.
157
C. Pacourek and Erickson: The Northern District of Illinois
Interprets the PDA
The Northern District of Illinois has twice held that the PDA
does in fact protect infertile women from adverse employment
action in both Pacourek158 and Erickson.159 The Seventh Circuit
cited both cases in Hall in support of its holding that Hall alleged a
cognizable claim of sex discrimination. 160 Like the Seventh Circuit
in Hall, the Pacourek and Erickson courts also relied on the
Supreme Court's "potential for pregnancy" language in Johnson
Controls.'6 ' Pacourek involved a plaintiff who was terminated
after eighteen years of employment for missing work to receive
fertility treatment. 162 Similarly, the plaintiff in Erickson was a
female employee who alleged that her employer hired a male to
replace her after she missed work to undergo fertility treatment.
163
153. Id. at 343.
154. Id. at 346.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
159. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Coils. & Univs for Ne. Ill. Univ.,
911 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
160. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008).
161. Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at319;Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1401.
162. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1396.
163. Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 318.
370 [Vol. 70
1. Pacourek
Charline Pacourek was diagnosed with esphofical reflux, a
medical condition that prevented her from becoming pregnant
naturally. 164 She became the University of Chicago's first IVF
patient and was subsequently terminated from her position at
Inland Steel.1
65
Pacourek alleged that her manager, Thomas Wides, had
"verbally abused [her] concerning her pregnancy related condition
by expressing doubt as to her ability to become pregnant and her
ability to combine pregnancy and her career."1 6 Pacourek also
alleged that Wides had told her that her esphofical reflux was "a
problem," that Wides had given her a memo that placed her on
probation, and that he informed Pacourek that she was considered
a high risk and would inevitably be terminated. 167 Pacourek further
claimed that Inland Steel "engaged in disparate treatment of [her
by] attempting to apply a sick leave policy to [her] due to [her]
pregnancy related condition, while the same sick leave policy was
not applied to other employees of Inland Steel."'
' 68
The court took "guidance" from Johnson Controls, holding that
Inland Steel had violated the PDA by discriminating against
Pacourek based on her "potential for pregnancy.' 69 The court also
looked to senators' language from the PDA floor debates, inferring
the senators' intent for the PDA to reach women's "capacity to
become pregnant."'
' 70
The Pacourek court then analyzed the text of the PDA, holding
that infertility is a pregnancy-related condition.' 71 According to the
court, the "related medical conditions" language is expansive.'
72
"Related," a "generous choice of wordin," suggests "inclusion
rather than exclusion in the close cases." r 3 The Pacourek court
also looked to the PDA's legislative history for support of its
164. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1396.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1397.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1401.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1402 ("Senator Harrison Williams, chief sponsor of the Senate bill
leading to the PDA, stated in floor debate that '[b]ecause of their capacity to
become pregnant, women have been viewed as marginal workers not deserving
the full benefits of compensation and advancement .... In some of these cases,
the employer refused to consider women for particular types of jobs on the
grounds that they might become pregnant."') (citations omitted).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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liberal construction 174 and concluded that it could find no reason to
exclude plaintiff's infertility from the protection of the PDA.175
2. Erickson
During Melinda Erickson's employment at Northeastern
Illinois University, she underwent infertility treatment.176 Erickson
claimed that, in May of 1993, her employer reprimanded her for
tardiness. 177 Subsequently, she received a six-month notice of
termination. 78 Erickson sued, claiming that her employer had
violated several statutes, including the PDA. 179 In response, the
employer moved for dismissal of the PDA claim, asserting that
infertility was not a pregnancy-related condition.18d The employer
rejected the district's decision in Pacourek, arguing that "infertility
is not a pregnancy-related condition within the meaning of the
PDA.' 18 ' The Erickson court, however, voiced its agreement with
Pacourek and held that the plaintiff had stated a cognizable claim
under the PDA. 182 In reaching this decision, the court relied on
both the "potential for pregnancy" language of Johnson Controls
and the statutory interpretation of the PDA utilized by the
174. Id. ("Furthermore, there is at least one indication in the PDA's
legislative history that such a liberal construction is proper: 'In using the broad
phrase "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth and related medical
conditions," the bill makes clear that its protection extends to the whole range of
matters concerning the childbearing process.' H.R.REP. NO. 95-948, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4753 (1978).")
175. Id. at 1402-03 ("The court can find no reason-not in the cases, not in
the legislative history, and, most significantly, not in the plain meaning of the
words of the statute-to exclude plaintiffs medical condition rendering her
unable to become pregnant naturally is a medical condition related to pregnancy
and childbirth for the purposes of the [PDA].").
176. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs. for Ne. Ill. Univ.,
911 F. Supp. 316, 317-18 (N.D. I11. 1995).
177. Id at 318.
178. Id
179. Id. at 317.
180. Id. at319.
181. Id.
182. Id at 320.
183. Id. at 318-20 ("Plaintiff alleges that she was discharged because of her
potential pregnancy. Like the Supreme Court in Johnson Controls, the Court
holds that 'the PDA means what it says,' and, thus, Plaintiff states a claim under
the PDA.").
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D. A Related Point of Contention Among the Courts: The PDA and
Oral Contraception
Another PDA-related debate among the courts involves
whether the Act protects a woman's right to oral contraception
coverage in her employer's prescription drug benefits plan.
1 84
Together, the contraception and infertility cases indicate the wide
range of issues for which plaintiffs argue the PDA offers
protection. The cases show the importance of narrowly tailoring
the PDA's scope and strictly defining the "related medical
conditions" protected by the Act. 
85
Many parallels can be drawn between cases discussing the
PDA's coverage of infertility and those concerning the PDA's
coverage of oral contraception. The problem of gender-neutrality,
for instance, plagues both issues. This is because a policy that
excludes oral contraceptives is technically gender-blind: both men
and women are denied coverage for birth control. 186 Because
employee benefit plans do not reimburse men for the cost of
condoms, employers argue that their plans treat women equally by
denying them coverage as well.18 7 Women, on the other hand,
argue that contraception directly affects their ability to control their
reproductive capacity, a sex-specific issue. Alternatively,
plaintiffs have argued that birth control pills are often prescribed
for medical reasons unrelated to contraception; thus, if an
employer's drug benefits plan provides full coverage to men but
does not include birth control, the plan may discriminate against
women by offering them less than comprehensive benefits.' 89
According to one scholar, gender discrimination claims
involving an employer's failure to include prescription birth
control in otherwise comprehensive prescription drug benefit plans
have "succeeded far more often and on more sweeping grounds"
than claims based on infertility treatments.' 9 Indeed, the EEOC
ruled in 2000 that an employer's exclusion of oral contraceptives
184. See, e.g., Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979 (E.D.
Mo. 2003); Stocking v. AT&T Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (W.D. Mo. 2006);
In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936 (8th Cir.
2007).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
186. SHERRY F. COLB, WHEN SEX COUNTS: MAKING BABIES AND MAKING
LAW 157 (2007).
187. Id. at 157-58.
188. Id. at 158.
189. Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n Enforcement Guidance,
Decision on Coverage of Contraception, 2000 WL 33407187 (Dec. 14, 2000).
190. Eldredge, supra note 5, at 885-86.
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may amount to discrimination on the basis of sex.1 91 The EEOC
relied on the Johnson Controls analysis, stating, "[T]he fact that it
is women, rather than men, who have the ability to become
pregnant cannot be used to penalize [women] in any way,
including in the terms and conditions of their employment. '' 92
In Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., the Eastern District of
Missouri sustained a similar claim for the coverage of
contraception under the PDA. 193 Cooley cited Johnson Controls for
the proposition that the PDA encompasses the potential for
pregnancy.194 Refusing to provide an employee with a medicine
that "allows [her] to control [her] reproductive capacity," said the
court, constitutes a "sex-based exclusion."'
195
Critics of the contraception cases have argued that the policy
reasons for advocating coverage of prescription birth control do
not justify a "sweeping interpretation of Title VII to compel that
coverage."' 96 The same argument exists in the infertility context.
Although women face unique challenges in regard to infertility and
its treatment, courts may not read into the PDA what Congress did
not intend to cover.
V. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S MISSTEP
In Hall the Seventh Circuit turned down the opportunity to
consider whether the PDA reaches infertility. Because the court
failed to recognize infertile women as a protected class and instead
relied on an irrelevant case, Hall's claim should not have
succeeded.
A. Reliance on Johnson Controls
Rather than analyze whether the PDA sweeps broadly enough
to reach infertility, the Seventh Circuit chose to rely on language
191. Coverage of Contraception, supra note 191.
192. Id.
193. 281 F. Supp. 2d 979 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
194. Id. at 984.
195. Id. Unlike Hall, the plaintiffs in Cooley also alleged straightforward sex
discrimination. Id. at 981. Under a disparate treatment claim, the plaintiffs
argued that contraceptives are commonly prescribed to women for medical
reasons other than contraception; that under the employer's plan, men were
completely protected and women were granted only partial protection; and that,
"to the extent that prescription contraceptives provide basic medical health care
for women, excluding such medication from the plan results in less
comprehensive benefits to women." Id. at 985. The court found these allegations
sufficient to state a claim of disparate treatment under Title VII. Id.
196. Backmeyer, supra note 5, at 459.
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from Johnson Controls, a case unrelated to infertility and its
treatment. 197 Hall should not have followed the reasoning of
Johnson Controls because the cases are inapposite. Whereas Hall
dealt with a narrow question concerning the PDA's scope,1 98
Johnson Controls analyzed a sex-specific fetal protection policy
that facially discriminated against women and thus constituted a
straightforward Title VII, disparate treatment claim.' 99 Johnson
Controls' reference to the PDA should not have been used in the
Hall analysis to arbitrarily differentiate between gender-neutral
and gender-specific aspects of infertility treatment.
Johnson Controls' policy explicitly discriminated against
female employees based on their potential for pregnancy. 20" The
case's "childbearing capacity" language, quoted so favorably by
the Seventh Circuit in Hall, originated not in the Supreme Court's
opinion but rather in the actual wording of Johnson Controls'
policy.201 Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not even view
Johnson Controls as a PDA-governed case. Rather, the Court
stated that its holding was merely "bolstered" by the PDA.20 2 "In
its use of the words 'capable of bearing children,"' said the
Supreme Court, "Johnson Controls explicitly classifies on the basis
of potential for pregnancy." 20 3 Relying on legislative history, the
Court stated that the PDA does not allow employers to treat all
female employees as "potentially pregnant.
' 204
In Hall, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Johnson
Controls differentiated between policies that classify based on the
gender-neutral characteristic of fertility alone and policies that
discriminate based on the "gender-specific quality of childbearing
capacity or potential for pregnancy." 20 5 The Seventh Circuit
interpreted this distinction to mean that, because Hall received
gender-specific treatment for her infertility, Nalco's adverse
employment action constituted discrimination. But the Seventh
Circuit ignored the fact that the Supreme Court based its holding
on the actual language of Johnson Controls' policy, stating that the
policy "is not neutral because it does not apply to the reproductive
197. Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 648-49 (7th Cir. 2008).
198. Id. at649n.3.
199. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991).
200. Id.
201. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d at 648 ("The Court held the policy was
invalid under the PDA because it 'classifie[d] on the basis of gender and
childbearing capacity, rather than fertility alone.').
202. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 199, 205.
205. Hall, 534 F.3d at 648 (citing Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198-99).
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capacity of the company's male employees in the same way as it
applies to that of females."
20 6
Unlike Johnson Controls, Nalco implemented no such policy.
Despite Hall's lack of evidence of disparate treatment, however,
the Seventh Circuit held that "Nalco's conduct ... suffer[ed] from
the same defect as the policy in Johnson Controls" because IVF is
a treatment received only by women. 207 Ignoring the fact that
Nalco had not promulgated a policy that facially discriminated
against female employees, the Seventh Circuit inappropriately
reached for a comparison between the holding in Johnson Controls
and the facts of Hall.
B. Problems with "Potential for Pregnancy"
Apart from the inapplicability of Johnson Controls to Hall,
there are policy reasons that disfavor a ruling based solely on
"potential for pregnancy." First, this wording is even more
ambiguous than "related medical conditions" and has no finite
scope. If discrimination based on infertility treatment constitutes
discrimination based on "childbearing capacity," then no woman
lacks a "potential for pregnancy." The PDA could thus be stretched
to encompass all women, at all stages of life. Furthermore, Hall v.
Nalco redefined Hall's infertility as "potential for pregnancy"
based on the treatment she received as a result of her condition. 1 8
If, however, Johnson Controls implicitly held that discrimination
based on "infertility alone" is gender-neutral and therefore does209
not violate the PDA, then it makes no sense to classify infertility
based on treatment. Men and women will always receive sex-
specific treatment to combat the gender-neutral problem, owing to
their respective biological make-ups.
The Seventh Circuit applied the broad "potential for
pregnancy" language to a very narrow procedure: IVF, one type of
surgical impregnation. The court did not address the PDA's
coverage of any other type of infertility-related treatment, such as
diagnosis or corrective surgery. The Seventh Circuit's holding is
therefore only narrowly instructive. Yet, the overbroad "potential
for pregnancy" language, on which the court's entire holding is
based, could be stretched to include a range of situations and
treatments never intended by Congress, the Supreme Court, or the
Seventh Circuit.
206. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199.
207. Hall, 534 F.3d at 648.
208. Id. at 648-49.
209. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198.
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C. Diverging from Pacourek and Erickson
Like the Seventh Circuit in Hall, the Northern District of
Illinois erroneously relied on Johnson Controls to apply the
"potential for pregnancy" language to adverse employment actions
involving female employees who miss work to receive infertility
treatments. However, in addition to relying on the language of
Johnson Controls, both Pacourek and Erickson also looked to the
actual text of the PDA, analyzing the all-important question:
whether the Act may encompass infertility.210 The Hall decision
ignored this question altogether, setting a very dangerous
precedent. The Seventh Circuit allowed the language of Johnson
Controls to exist as the sole reason for recognizing Hall's claim
against Nalco. Essentially, according to the Seventh Circuit's
analysis, Hall's entire case rested on one phrase from an
inapplicable Supreme Court case.
VI. PROPER ANALYSES OF HALL'S CLAIM
There is no need for courts to continue to broaden the scope of
the PDA beyond its actual wording for two reasons. First,
Congess, not the courts, is vested with the power to amend the
Act. I After all, Congress enacted the PDA to amend sex
discrimination to include "pregnancy, childbirth and related
medical conditions.' '21 2 If the Legislature wanted to likewise
amend pregnancy discrimination to include "infertility" or
"surgical impregnation procedures," then it could certainly do so.
Before Congress acts, however, courts should not continue to rely
on Johnson Controls as justification for "introducing a completely
new classification of prohibited discrimination., 213 Second, federal
legislation already offers plaintiffs with claims such as Hall's
avenues of redress outside the realm of the PDA, including Title
VII's recognition of disparate impact and disparate treatment
theories as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act.
A. Sex-Plus
The Seventh Circuit essentially viewed Hall's claim as one of
disparate treatment.214 Had the court held that infertile women
210. Erickson, 911 F. Supp. at 320; Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1403.
211. Id.
212. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).
213. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003).
214. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008).
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constitute a protected class under the PDA, then, presumably,
Hall's claim would have succeeded because she offered direct
evidence of discrimination based on infertility.215 However, the
Seventh Circuit refused to recognize such a class. Rather than rely
on Johnson Controls to broaden the scope of the PDA, the court
should have viewed Hall's claim as one of sex-plus infertility.
While sex-plus issues are common among disparate treatment
claims based on gender discrimination, 2 16 a valid sex-plus claim can
be made only when there is a similarly situated subclass of men who
are treated differently than women.2 17 In Johnson Controls, for
instance, one of the plaintiffs was a member of the similarly situated
subclass-a fertile male employee who wished to have children but
could not transfer out of a job that exposed him to dangerous levels
of lead. 2 18 Hall, however, offered no evidence of Nalco's disparate
treatment.21 9 She made no showing that the company had treated
infertile men any better than it had treated her.220 Thus, Hall's claim
should have fallen under a disparate impact theory, wherein Hall
should have argued that Nalco's policy disproportionately impacted
female employees.221 Those scholars who wish to include infertile
women within the ambit of the PDA may argue that sex-plus cases
are too difficult to sustain in an infertility context-that rarely if
ever will an employee be able to show that an employer treated
215. Id. at 649. Hall alleged that her boss told her that her termination was
"in [her] interest due to [her] health condition" of infertility. Id.
216. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 8, at 83. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (sex plus pre-school-aged children); Int'l
Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (sex plus childbearing
capacity); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir. 1995) (sex plus marital
status); King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1984) (sex
plus family status).
217. See LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 40.04 (2d ed.
2002), quoted in Eldredge, supra note 5, at 879 ("[W]hen one proceeds to cancel
out the common characteristics of the two classes being compared ([e.g.]
married men and married women), as one would do in solving an algebraic
equation, the cancelled-out element proves to be that of married status, and sex
remains the only operative factor in the equation .... Plaintiffs may fail to state
a claim when such a subclass does not exist."). See also Coleman v. B-G Maint.
Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[G]ender-plus
plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no corresponding subclass of
members of the opposite gender. Such plaintiffs cannot make the requisite
showing that they were treated differently from similarly situated members of
the opposite gender.").
218. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 192 (1991).
219. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Cheryl Hall at 7, Hall v. Nalco Co., 534
F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3684).
220. Id.
221. Kobylak, supra note 22, at 19.
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infertile men differently than infertile women.2 22 However, it is not
up to the courts to read into a congressional act protection that does
not exist.223 The fact that infertile women suffer adverse
employment action as a result of their condition does not justify a
sweeping interpretation of the PDA.
B. Disparate Impact Claims
Though infertile women may not constitute a protected class
under the PDA, a female employee who suffers adverse
employment action as a result of facially neutral employer policy
may still bring a claim of disparate impact under Title VII. 224 A
plaintiff may claim disparate impact when an employer policy does
not discriminate on its face but affects a protected class
disproportionately. 225 Thus, if an employer policy disparately
affects female employees who, for instance, are more burdened by
infertility treatments than male employees, a court may find the
policy violative of Title VII. According to the Eighth Circuit in
Krauel, in order to prove a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must
offer statistical evidence sufficient to prove that the employer
practice or policy unequally affected the protected class. 226 The
Fifth Circuit, however, has held that, in some cases, a plaintiff may
not necessarily have to present statistical evidence of disparate
impact.22
7
A plaintiff who suffers from adverse employment action for
missing work due to a pregnancy-related or gender-specific
condition must keep in mind that neither Title VII nor the PDA
requires an employer to make any accommodation for members of
the protected class that it does not make for its other employees.
Thus, in Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., the Fifth Circuit held that
a plaintiff may not claim disparate impact when her employer
merely refused to grant her medical leave that it did not offer to
other, non-pregnant employees. 228 "To hold otherwise," said the
222. See, e.g., Eldredge, supra note 5, at 876.
223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("Congress shall have Power To... make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
(emphasis added)).
224. See supra Part I.
225. See Eldredge, supra note 5, at 878.
226. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
227. See Garcia v. Woman's Hosp. of Tex., 97 F.3d 810 (5th Cir. 1996),
discussed in Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856 (5th Cir. 2002).
228. Stout, 282 F.3d at 862 ("Stout has no evidence that Baxter has in any
way applied its policy unevenly or has favored non-pregnant employees. In the
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Fifth Circuit, "would be to transform the PDA into a guarantee of
medical leave for pregnant employees, something we have
specifically held that the PDA does not do. ' 22 9
C. Infertility as a Disability
Hall did not allege that Nalco committed a violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),230 but according to at least
one scholar, the ADA is a better vehicle than the PDA for an
employee's claims concerning adverse employment action based on
infertility.23 1 Unlike the PDA, which requires equal, not preferential
treatment,232 the ADA requires employers to make "reasonable
accommodations" for disabled employees, which may include time
off from work.23 3 Because Hall, Pacourek, and Erickson were each
fired for missing work in order to receive infertility treatments,234
the ADA's requirement of a reasonable accommodation supplies
such plaintiffs with better, more specifically tailored protection.
1. How the ADA Works
The ADA prohibits: (1) treating a qualified individual with a
disability differently because of the disability, perceived disability,
or record of a disability; (2) not making a reasonable
accommodation for known physical or mental limitation of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability; and (3) using
qualification standards or selection devices that tend to screen out
end, Stout's claim in this case is simply that she should have been granted
medical leave that is more generous than that granted to non-pregnant
employees. This the PDA does not require.").
229. Id. at 861.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12113 (2006). The ADA Amendments Act became
law on January 1, 2009. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006). The Amendments Act
may change the law with regard to disability discrimination. However, the
ramifications of the Amendment with regard to ADA jurisprudence remain to be
seen.
231. James B. Roche, After Bragdon v. Abbott: Why Legislation is Still Needed
to Mandate Infertility Insurance, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 215, 224 (2002).
232. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) ("[W]omen affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions, shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes.") (emphasis added).
233. LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 766 (W.D.
Mich. 2001).
234. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2008); Erickson v. Bd. of
Governors of State Colls. & Univs. for Ne. Ill. Univ., 911 F. Supp. 316, 318 (N.D.
Ill. 1995); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1396 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
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235individuals with disabilities. The Act applies in an employment
context according to section 102(a), which prohibits discrimination
against a member of the protected class "because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.
236
Plaintiffs filing a claim under the ADA must establish that they
have (1) a physical or mental impairment (2) that substantially limits
(3) a major life activity and (4) that they are qualified in that they
can perform "essential job duties" with or without reasonable
accommodation.
237
In determining whether an individual has an impairment as
defined by the ADA, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the
analysis must take place on a case-by-case basis, with consideration
for the condition's effect on the individual.238 The ADA regulations
define impairment broadly to include physiological disorders or
conditions, cosmetic disfigurements, anatomical losses affecting one
or more body systems, or any mental or psychological disorders.
239
Pregnancy is not covered,2 ° but one court has indicated that
complications arising from pregnancy could rise to the level of a
statutory impairment.
24 1
Before 1998, some courts refused to hold that reproduction
constituted a major life activity under the ADA, and these courts
denied relief to plaintiffs with claims similar to Hall's. 242 But, in
Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court classified "reproduction and
235. THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
289 (2001).
236. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
237. HAGGARD, supra note 237, at 290-99.
238. Id. at 291 (citing Albertson's v. Kirkinburg, 527 U.S. 471 (1999)).
239. Id. at 291.
240. Id. (citing Beverly v. Herr Foods, Inc., No. Civ. A. 92-7382, 1993 WL
101196 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
241. Id. at 292. See Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
242. See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th
Cir. 1996). There were exceptions to this pre-1998 rule, however. The court in
Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. I11. 1994), for example,
held that the plaintiff had stated a claim under the ADA. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp.
at 1404. Charline Pacourek brought a claim under the ADA, claiming that
defendants discriminated against her on the basis of a "physical impairment that
substantially limits one of [her] major life activities-reproduction." Id.
Pacourek's impairment, esphofical reflux, prevented her from becoming
pregnant naturally. Id The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, held that Pacourek's condition was a physical or mental
impairment that affected a major life activity and that the major life activity was
substantially limited by the impairment. Id. at 1404-05.
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sexual activity" as a major life activity under the ADA.243 Bragdon
involved a claim by a patient infected with HIV who brought an
action under the ADA against a dentist who refused to treat her in
his office.244 The Court indicated in Bragdon that "the plain
language meaning of the word 'major' denotes comparative
importance" and "suggest[s] that the touchstone for determining an
activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric is its significance."
The Court thus held that reproduction was a major life activity, since
"[r]eproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central
to the life process itself., 245 This decision has made the ADA
applicable to a plaintiff with a claim like Hall's.
2. LaPorta: Pregnant with Possibility
In 2001, the United States District Court for the Western District
of Michigan decided LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,246 a case that
arose from a fact pattern similar to that of Hall. Michelle LaPorta, a
pharmacist, missed several weeks of work to undergo a cycle of IVF
treatment in August of 1997. This initial procedure proved
unsuccessful, and LaPorta scheduled a second treatment.24P After
missing a day of work for a preliminary procedure related to this
second round of IVF treatment, LaPorta was terminated.249 LaPorta
subsequently filed suit against her employer, alleging discrimination
under both the PDA and the ADA.25 United States Magistrate
Judge Scoville relied on Krauel to deny plaintiffs PDA claim,
251
specifically disagreeing with the Northern District of Illinois in
Pacourek and finding Krauel "a more persuasive authority on [the]
issue of statutory construction" of the PDA.252 The court concluded
"that infertility is not a medical condition related to pregnancy or
childbirth within the meaning of the PDA.,
253
Judge Scoville sustained LaPorta's claim under the ADA,
however, presenting an extremely thorough and well-reasoned five-254
step analysis. First, the court followed the EEOC's regulations
243. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
244. Id. at 628-29.
245. HAGGARD, supra note 237, at 294 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638).
246. 163 F. Supp. 2d 758 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
247. Id. at 762.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 763.
251. Id. at 770.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 763-70.
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defining physical impairments, which include a physiological
disorder or condition that affects the body's reproductive system.a55
Quoting language from Saks that defined infertility as the "chronic
failure of an organ system," the court in LaPorta stated that the
condition "falls squarely within" the regulation's description.2 56 The
court then relied on Bragdon's holding7that reproduction falls well
within the phrase "major life activity."
Next, the court held that infertility substantially limits the major
life activity of reproduction, relying again on Bragdon v. Abbott for
the proposition that "[t]he Act addresses substantial limitations on
major life activities, not utter inabilities." 258 The court thus rejected
defendant's argument that because plaintiff eventually became
pregnant as a result of her fertility treatments, plaintiffs infertility
had not substantially limited her reproductive capacity.259
According to the court, plaintiff's request for time off fell "well
within [the] statutory definition" of "reasonable accommodation"
under the ADA.260 An enormous amount of disability law is devoted
to determining what constitutes a reasonable accommodation-
which, if made, would render an individual qualified to perform the
essential functions of the job and, if not made, would constitute an
illegal form of discrimination.26' Judge Scoville pointed out that
reasonable accommodation under the ADA is a question of fact, and262
a plaintiff bears the burden of proving reasonableness. Once the
plaintiff does so, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show
the unreasonableness of the accommodation in terms of the
particular circumstance facing the employer and employee. 63
Finally, the LaPorta court addressed the issue of causation. A
plaintiff seeking to establish a claim for wrongful termination under
the ADA must show that she suffered the adverse employment
action because of her disability.264 Defendant-Wal-Mart argued that
the plaintiff was fired not because of her disability but for her refusal
to appear for work. 265 The court found that Wal-Mart's refusal to
grant the plaintiff time off to receive the infertility treatment,
255. Id.
256. Id. at 764.
257. Id. at 765.
258. Id. at 766 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 644 (1998)).
259. Id. at 765-66.
260. Id at 766 ("Under the definitional section of the ADA, the term 'reasonable
accommodation' is defined to include among other things, 'job restructuring' or
'part-time or modified work schedules' 42 U.S.C. § 1211 l(9)(B).").
261. HAGGARD, supra note 237, at 299.
262. LaPorta, 163 F. Supp. at 766.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 768.
265. Id. at 769.
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followed by its decision to terminate her for her failure to appear for
work on that day, constituted a jury-submissible issue.266
LaPorta stands as an instructive example of an infertile female
employee who presented a cognizable employment discrimination
claim through a theory other than the PDA. Because, under
Bragdon, reproduction is considered a major life activity,267 the
ADA may reach out to protect employees such as Cheryl Hall from
being terminated for receiving infertility treatment. Granting
protection under the ADA rather than the PDA for infertility
treatments would also ensure that men as well as women are
protected for receiving treatment for infertility. Perhaps most
importantly, however, the ADA, unlike the PDA, requires
employers to make reasonable accommodations for disabled
employees. Because female employees who undergo infertility often
must miss work to receive treatment, LaPorta's holding that time
off constitutes a reasonable accommodation makes the ADA a better
avenue of redress for plaintiffs like Hall and LaPorta.
VII. CONCLUSION
The incidence of infertility is increasing in the United States.268
Studies indicate that over the past two decades, men in the
industrialized world have experienced a decline in sperm quality.269
At the same time, women are choosing to have children later in lifeth an t eyd id 270
than they once did. In fact, twenty percent of women in the
United States are waiting until age thirty-five or older to have their
first child, 271 and women in this age range are twice as likely to have
problems conceiving as women in their early thirties.2
72
Consequently, infertility and its treatment will continue to pose
problems for women in the workplace. As more and more female
employees suffer adverse employment action as a result of IVF or
other infertility treatments, it is imperative that courts analyze the
resulting suits properly and appropriately.
Congress may one day choose to extend the PDA to reach
infertility, but it has yet to do so. For now, there are many other
266. Id.
267. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 644 (1998).
268. MARY JANE MINKIN & CAROL V. WRIGHT, THE YALE GUIDE TO
WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 298 (2003).
269. Id. at 300. The decline may be attributable to occupational hazards,
environmental pollutants, medications, and sexually transmitted diseases. Id.
270. Id.
271. WomensHealth.org, Frequently Asked Questions: Infertility, http://
www.womenshealth.gov/faq/infertility.cfn (last visited July 1, 2009).
272. MMJKIN & WRIGHT, supra note 270, at 300.
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theories under which a plaintiff like Hall should assert her claim.
This is not to say that an infertile female employee who suffers
adverse employment action will surely succeed on one or any of
these theories. But it is up to a plaintiff to present a prima facie case
of discrimination, whether the claim invokes Title VII, the PDA, or
the ADA. It is not up to the courts to stretch the scope of federal
legislation in order to protect a plaintiff who cannot meet her burden
of proof.
Erin Percy*
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